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ESSAY
COVID- as a Mass Death Event
Yuna Han, Katharine M. Millar, and Martin J. Bayly
COVID- has killed over two million people worldwide.
 Though efforts
to curb the transmission of the virus have resulted in dramatic economic
costs and changes to everyday life, the central fact of the virus itself is
death and suffering on a mass transnational scale. When looked at from the per-
spective of excess mortality (the number of deaths that exceed statistical models of
“expected” deaths for a given year, partially based on five-year averages) or sec-
ondary effects of the pandemic such as economic deprivation, the death toll is
likely to be substantially higher. Even for those fortunate enough to be shielded
from the direct effects of the virus, it has been near impossible to escape the global
images of struggling intensive care units, overflowing mortuaries, and the con-
struction of mass graves.
We lay out this picture of grief and loss to suggest that, in order to fully under-
stand the politics of COVID-, we need to stare death in the face. The pandemic
is a mass death event, and assessments of the political and normative impact of the
pandemic should center their focus on individual and collective experiences of
death, loss, and grief. By foregrounding death in theorizing the pandemic, we
argue, we will be better able to understand the ways in which the pandemic is reor-
dering the world than if we were to look at formal politics or economic contrac-
tions alone. Crucially, centering the impact on experiences of death and grief may
help us more clearly formulate the normative questions necessary to imagine bet-
ter post-pandemic futures. Ultimately, conceptualizing the pandemic as an expe-
rience of death on a mass scale is to ask the question: How will, and should,
politics value human lives in the post-pandemic world?
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The essay begins by demonstrating a notable silence around death in the emerg-
ing scholarly debate on the politics of COVID-, which has been framed primar-
ily as a matter of either (a) state-based multilateralism or (b) a complication of
other pre-existing politico-economic concerns. We then reflect upon other
instances of mass death (such as those resulting from human rights atrocities or
complex emergencies) to conceptualize COVID- as a mass death event and
elaborate on the kind of analytical and theoretical insights offered by this
approach. We conclude by briefly outlining a future research agenda that interro-
gates the politics and ethics of the COVID- pandemic as a transnational expe-
rience of ambiguous loss.
Writing about the COVID- pandemic as it is happening presents a particular
set of emotional and personal challenges, as we along with everyone else are expe-
riencing it, affected by it, and cannot easily abstract from it. This is a fresh and often
uncomfortable experience for us, and many other relatively privileged scholars. This
is not, however, a novel situation; these are the conditions—and stakes—of knowl-
edge production for scholars who research, write, and advocate within situations of
conflict (or its immediate aftermath), environmental degradation, mass displace-
ment, and/or ongoing racialized and (settler) colonial violence. Contemporary dis-
cussions of COVID-—in theory and practice—have often been suggestive of a
sense of detachment from the immediacy, scale, uncertainty, and grief associated
with the crisis. In this context, we want to acknowledge our positionality—particu-
larly the relative safety within which we experience the pandemic—as we call for
greater scholarly and affective engagement with the politics of death.
The Word Not Spoken
It is too early to fully assess the literature on COVID-. The scholarly conversa-
tion within political science and international relations thus far, however, has been
curiously silent on the politics produced by death, and the surrounding experi-
ences of grief and loss. Although the human cost of the pandemic has been
noted, for example, in the acknowledgment that while COVID- “is no world
war . . . its casualties are heavy and growing,” the specific experience of death
is considered politically significant only in a limited manner. This is not dissimilar
to the narratives and distancing strategies used by various political leaders around
the world that aim to shift the focus to the mitigation of, or “recovery” from, the
pandemic.
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This omission is the result of two interrelated trends in the literature. First, as
efforts to curb COVID- have been driven by government policies, evaluations of
the political impact of the pandemic have centered on the form and function of
state government. A Foreign Policy roundtable, for instance, asks whether the
experience of COVID- will “permanently expand government powers” across
the world, while other commentators have considered whether autocratic or
democratic forms of government are better suited to effectively deal with viral out-
breaks. Assessments of COVID-’s international political effects are similarly
state-centric, examining the effects of the pandemic on cooperation between states
in an anarchic system, the authority of international organizations over state
behavior, and shifts in the balance of power between states, particularly powerful
ones such as the United States and China. From this perspective, pandemic fatal-
ities only matter if the magnitude is great enough to upend the absolute and/or
relative power of a state. For some, the current pandemic has not been deadly
enough to be politically significant at the international level.
Second, death is presented in relation to other goals and political values, such as
economic prosperity and material wellbeing, or civil liberties and human rights.
For example, discussions of the pandemic’s global economic impact often refer
primarily to the costs imposed by policies designed to reduce death rates on global
trade and immigration or domestic productivity. Others have considered
whether policy interventions designed to reduce fatality rates result in diminished
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms. These analyses express
concerns related to privacy, for instance, as greater surveillance measures designed
to curb transmission may accelerate democratic backsliding, further oppress
minoritized groups, and intensify militarized border controls. In thinking
about pandemic responses designed to reduce transmission—and thus fatalities
—these discussions implicitly conceptualize death as a target of future mitigation.
Death as an already-existing and ongoing phenomenon within society remains
underexplored. How are societies processing these experiences of death, and
what politics do they produce?
State-centric, mitigation-focused contributions are not unwarranted. States are
important actors in the response to the pandemic; in a context of limited political
and material resources, policymakers face difficult choices in preserving lives at
the expense of other referents of value under “normal” circumstances. What
the evaluations of these choices—academically and in practice—are missing,
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however, is direct discussion and theorization of the occurrence and experience of
death itself.
The inability to directly talk about mass death in our theorizing is not limited to
the study of pandemics but is a general problem in the empirical study of political
phenomena. International relations and political science scholarship rarely con-
sider death directly as an analytical category. Instead, it is frequently posited as
the implicit reason for politics; the risk of death justifies and underwrites the
notion of the state. Jessica Auchter, for instance, argues that the overarching
focus on survival in the study of security means that death is only discussed in
relation to the failure of the system, in the form of statistics or images that prompt
action to further interventions for mitigation. Actual death, however, is typically
treated either instrumentally—as in military lives that are considered legitimately
risked for the state—or, more indirectly, as a problem for social order and post-
conflict or post-disaster “recovery.”
Though international relations and political science are certainly concerned
with the study of human rights violations and mass atrocity crimes, they tend
to work and write around death itself, focusing on the causes and prevention of
death rather than the ongoing social and political consequences of the dying
that is presently occurring, and of the now-missing dead. Himadeep Muppidi
observes that international relations frequently translates death into a colonial,
racialized “numerical gaze,” through the language of statistics, military strategy,
and the law, making death less scandalous, particularly with regards to events
that happen in the Global South. Death and, particularly, grief are then posited
as private, cultural, and social matters that are implicitly or explicitly presented as
occurring “elsewhere.” Though tragic, death itself does not directly implicate
politics or power; violence does—and death is the apolitical aftermath.
Consequently, mass death that occurs as a result of seemingly natural events
like hurricanes, in which power relations are not obvious, or that has occurred
in “powerful” states that are not accustomed to attending to mass death—
both of which are conditions that characterize death in the age of COVID-—
is even harder to conceptualize.
Critical international relations scholarship, however, informed by the insights
of anthropology and sociology, finds that death is not “merely” a private affair,
but a deeply political experience that can threaten or transform social order.
State institutions and elites have long played significant roles in managing both
the material aspects of death and the collective processes of grief and mourning,
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creating an intersection of the formal political realm with the private and societal
practices through which individuals, families, and communities process loss.
Facing Death in the COVID-19 Pandemic
Centering the focus on death in our accounts of the current COVID- pandemic,
as well as in the analyses of past pandemics and postpandemic futures, therefore
offers an opportunity to expand our analytical horizon. Using the experience of
death and its sociopolitical implications rather than the causes of death as the
comparative foci, we are able to put the current COVID- crisis in dialogue
with scholarship pertaining to other experiences of mass death that may not be
obviously similar to a viral pandemic.
The first step in this analytical reorientation is understanding the particular
nature of pandemic death. We argue that COVID- death has been and contin-
ues to be marked by ambiguity, not only in terms of private losses but also as a
collective experience of sociopolitical meaning. While ambiguity does not inher-
ently produce negative effects on the individuals and societies experiencing it,
we contend that the ambiguity surrounding the experience of death in the present
pandemic nevertheless has the potential to result in broader long-term conse-
quences. On one hand, COVID- deaths present the hallmarks of what medical
and sociological literatures refer to as “bad” deaths, or “poor quality deaths
marked by physical discomfort, difficulty breathing, psychological distress, lack
of preparation, being treated without respect or dignity, and the receipt of
unwanted medical interventions or being deprived of treatments one desires.”
The virus causes a highly contagious respiratory disease that results in many
patients dying in isolation, particularly as many hospitals and care homes prevent
patients from having visitors. Overwhelmed and overcrowded medical and mor-
tuary services have meant that at times bodies have not been treated with the dig-
nity they would normally receive. The physical and material process and
conditions of dying from COVID- are different from those of other forms of
“natural” disease-related deaths. This disruption and difference—even suffering
—is partially how deaths become socially and politically relevant. The deaths
are (at least potentially) “bad” for the person dying, but also traumatic for their
loved ones, community, and, often, the medical personnel attempting to care
for them. As a consequence, bad death has a legacy that can extend trauma and
social dislocation forward in time.
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Compounding this condition of bad deaths is the ambiguity of information
associated with the virus. As a novel virus, the public understanding of the pro-
gression and suffering caused by COVID- remains opaque. This makes it
more difficult, privately and collectively, for the public to read COVID- deaths
into existing social scripts or, alternatively, to create new rituals to produce “good”
deaths. Furthermore, in countries where testing and medical facilities were (or
currently are) overwhelmed, it is not always made clear for the families and
loved ones of the deceased whether the individual had succumbed to
COVID- or another similar respiratory illness. For example, in April 
when the U.K. was under a nationwide lockdown, eighteen thousand more care
home residents died than the previous monthly average, but only eight thousand
of these deaths were directly attributed to COVID- on death certificates, raising
questions about the other ten thousand. For family members of U.K. care home
residents who were told that their loved one died of a “horrible chest infection,”
ambiguity persists about how and why their family member died. This, in
turn, raises questions regarding health inequalities, access to care, and, ultimately,
accountability.
Moreover, “normal” processes of grieving—through which individuals and col-
lectives make sense of the death—are being dramatically interrupted during the
pandemic. “Bad” deaths generally are difficult to grieve; they challenge notions
of idealized death that are painless and dignified, preclude family members
from having meaningful conversations to say goodbye, and create a sense that
the death was unjust and preventable. Grieving processes during the
COVID- pandemic face particular challenges due to various policies put in
place by governments to prevent the further transmission of the virus and to
relieve the stress on overburdened medical facilities. In our cross-country compar-
ison of COVID- death management policies (covering funereal and mortuary
practices and commemorative efforts) among the U.K., Germany, Italy, and
South Korea, we found that all four governments had put in place stringent
restrictions related to burials and funeral practices that substantially altered prev-
alent grieving practices in their respective communities, such as mandating cre-
mation in place of burials. Across the globe, scenes emerged that starkly
departed from the norm of rituals surrounding death as authorities struggled to
respond to rapidly increasing numbers of fatalities and to prevent further trans-
missions. In New York, drone footage found mass graves being dug on Hart
Island; in Guayaquil, Ecuador, bodies were left in homes and by the streets
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for days until city officials could collect them for burial. Bad deaths thus are not
only a natural product of the virus but a direct consequence of state intervention;
they are political.
Such interruption of grieving processes—particularly by forceful state interven-
tions—creates ambiguity in the social understanding of COVID- deaths. While
all deaths to some degree potentially disrupt social order by exposing the limita-
tions on the ability of state institutions and political elites to provide security for
societal members, this is particularly true for deaths that do not follow widely
accepted social scripts. In contrast to the deaths of soldiers, for instance, who
die in a “just” or popularly supported war, which may be characterized as accept-
able or unavoidable, if tragic, consequences of state actions, COVID- is a mass
death event that defies existing narratives. Depending on the context, the state is
posited as either culpable for COVID- fatalities or—perhaps in a manner inef-
fably worse—powerless or irrelevant in the face of the pandemic. COVID- not
only exposes our interdependent vulnerabilities to transnational disease but also
threatens to reveal the political fiction that is the modern state’s ability to produce
security. Ambiguous deaths thus have a long tail in terms of not only trauma, as
noted earlier, but also the potential for both unacknowledged or unrecognized
trauma to unsettle the social order and conventional mode of political authority.
Focusing on the ambiguous nature of death thus allows us to cast the compar-
ative net wider than focusing on the cause of death alone. For example, the expe-
rience of enforced disappearances—broadly defined as a state’s refusal to
acknowledge the occurrence of arrest, detention, abduction, or sometimes extraju-
dicial killings by state agents or concealment of the fate of the victims—produces
similar experiences of traumatic ambiguity. The ability of families and societies to
grieve and understand the loss of life is often forestalled by the explicit efforts of
powerful state institutions to conceal, underplay, and obfuscate both the true fates
of the victims and the role state agents have played in them. Human rights and
transitional justice scholarship has understood this ambiguity as a form of contin-
uous harm that goes beyond the individual experience of trauma. This under-
standing has promoted the recognition of victims’ right to truth as distinct
from the need for accountability or financial reparations following mass death
due to human rights violations.
Political mobilization—such as that of the famous Argentinian group
Asociación Madres de Plaza de Mayo (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo), who
held a vigil to demand information on their missing and disappeared adult
covid‐19 as a mass death event 11
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679421000022
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 77.100.17.158, on 10 May 2021 at 07:55:16, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
children—is thus a response to oppression (and denialism) in the formal political
sphere as well as the grief of ambiguous death. This suggests that moves to
explicitly minimize or deny the COVID- pandemic, as seen in the United
States and Brazil, or policies that fail to effectively and transparently communi-
cate, such as those in the United Kingdom, are not only forms of harm but are
likely to compound grief through a failure of recognition. From this, it is reason-
able to expect that the politics of COVID- deaths will soon follow a similar tra-
jectory, involving countermobilization by families and loved ones of decedents
who contest broader state narratives of inevitable deaths and dramatic recoveries.
In June , for instance, Noi Denunceremo (We Will Denounce You), a group
of COVID- victims’ relatives, filed fifty legal complaints against various Italian
political officials to seek justice, answers, and accountability for their loved ones’
deaths. Given the transnational nature of the pandemic, it is plausible to expect
this mobilization to cross state boundaries and even take on an explicitly global
character. By not conceptualizing the COVID- pandemic as a mass death
event, we risk missing the emergence of new forms of political consciousness,
organization, and belonging.
Conclusion
Centering the focus on the experience of death and grief when theorizing the pol-
itics of the COVID- pandemic thus is an exercise of analytic expansion, drawing
parallels from a wide array of mass death events—including experiences of simi-
larly ambiguous deaths that have resulted from phenomena more conventionally
understood as political, such as mass human rights violations, armed conflicts,
and state violence. This analytical move raises areas of further inquiry, such as
how public narratives of death are formed, what kinds of state intervention may
have exacerbated the condition of “bad” deaths and how they are contested,
how the politics of memorialization manifests in the context of COVID-, and
how particular forms of political mobilizations arise as societies grapple with
the ambiguous meanings of pandemic deaths.
Most past pandemics—with the possible exception(s) of the bubonic plagues of
the fourteenth century and occasionally the mass deaths of indigenous peoples
due to diseases introduced by European colonizers—have been disregarded,
viewed as politically insignificant events specifically because they were not recog-
nized as mass death events. The stakes of this elision underscore the urgency of
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this new research agenda. The influenza pandemic of – (the so-called
Spanish flu) had been largely forgotten in both popular discourse and academic
scholarship, despite the unsurprising upswing in contemporary interest. Some
scholars, such as Dan Drezner, point toward this collective amnesia as evidence
of its insignificance as a political event. As Jeremy Youde suggests, however,
the “forgetting” of the – influenza pandemic is more likely the result
of a contemporaneous inability to understand it as a mass death event. The mag-
nitude of the loss of life due to influenza was obscured by the dominating context
of World War I and the poor quality of information on the scale and causes of
death both domestically and transnationally. Historians also suggest that since
many influenza victims were young, working-class, women, and/or marginalized
people lacking in political power and social status, their deaths were considered
insufficiently socially visible to compel commemoration. And yet, the “absent
bodies” of – left profound societal and political changes in their wake
—giving rise to other similar results abroad; for example, as Susan Kingsley
Kent suggests, a more parochial and nativist identity of “Englishness” in the
United Kingdom; or, as Laura Spinney argues, the strengthening of the indepen-
dence movement in India and the apartheid system in South Africa. The inabil-
ity to understand the – influenza epidemic as a mass death event, both
then and now, represents a missed opportunity to understand its full impact.
An even more fundamental normative payoff comes from a second avenue of
inquiry: Centering our focus on the experience of mass death in our theorization
allows us to directly question the basic assumptions of politics more generally.
What does death reveal about the politics of how we value life? Michael
Barnett, for example, explicitly argues that the COVID- pandemic has revealed
how neoliberal market logics shape our ethical decisions surrounding whose lives
are valued and whose deaths are considered necessary sacrifices for progress.
Focusing on the nature of ambiguous death by COVID- draws attention to
the political and normative discomfort caused by facing the trade-offs implicit
in our current day-to-day politics and the refusal to accept its reasoning: economy
vs. health; state security vs. individual wellbeing; international state system stabil-
ity vs. transnational mobilization and transformation.
We hear echoes of these questions in many of the scholarly discussions on
COVID- that have taken place thus far. There are concerns that the failure of
governments to manage the material and affective aspects of the pandemic may
accelerate fascist or populist movements; that it may unsettle and expose the
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neoliberal assumptions of trade-offs in politics and economics; and that it may
intensify nationalism, xenophobia, and democratic backsliding. All of these con-
cerns highlight the ways COVID- is challenging and transforming our world
and worldview(s). Analyzing these changes through the narrow lens of state-
centric politics and multifaceted mitigation in the pursuit of an immediate return
to something called normal—ignoring the multiplicity of injustices, inequities, and
inequalities upon which “normal” life is founded and that COVID- magnifies—
ultimately limits our collective imaginative ability to consider the transformative
moment brought about by the pandemic. There is no guarantee that the post–
COVID- world will be necessarily more ethical or laudable than the present
one. Thinking clearly and carefully about the specific experience of mass death
brought on by COVID-, however, seems to be a prerequisite to imagining a
more ethically desirable future after the pandemic.
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Abstract: As of the first week of February , the COVID- pandemic has resulted in over two
million people dead across the globe. This essay argues that in order to fully understand the politics
arising from the COVID- pandemic, we need to focus on the individual and collective experi-
ences of death, loss, and grief. While the emerging scholarly discourse on the pandemic, particu-
larly in political science and international relations, typically considers death only in terms of its
effects on formal state-level politics and as a policy objective for mitigation, we argue that focusing
on the particularities of the experience of death resulting from COVID- can help us fully under-
stand the ways in which the pandemic is reordering our worlds. Examining the ambiguous socio-
political meaning of death by COVID- can provide broader analytical comparisons with other
mass death events. Ultimately, the essay argues that centering the impact of the pandemic on
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for a more ethical future.
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